My Rabbit’s anti-ship ballistic missiles are now blown by the media as the most offensive and destructive weapon to deter the U.S. aircraft carrier formation, but how can the aircraft carrier formation’s air defense and anti-missile capabilities be vegetarian? The existing Aegis system, Can it be intercepted effectively? Standard series missiles. I have seen the Ticonderoga-class Lake Erie conducted anti-missile and anti-defense combat drills before. Do all US cruisers now have this combat effectiveness?

My Rabbit’s anti-ship ballistic missiles are now blown by the media as the most offensive and destructive weapon to deter the U.S. aircraft carrier formation, but how can the aircraft carrier formation’s air defense and anti-missile capabilities be vegetarian? The existing Aegis system, Can it be intercepted effectively? Standard series missiles. I have seen the Ticonderoga-class Lake Erie conducted anti-missile and anti-defense combat drills before. Do all US cruisers now have this combat effectiveness?

The standard 3 kinetic energy interceptor is roughly in this style, just like the spacecraft in the vast sky, without considering aerodynamic issues.

In theory, standard 3 can be intercepted before the incoming weapon enters the super gliding phase, but it takes time to go through the complete interception process (the above figure shows the land-based interceptor, the principle is the same as that of the sea-based interceptor). If ASBM Standard 3 begins to dive before reaching the interception point, and from a ballistic vehicle outside the atmosphere to a super glider in the upper atmosphere, Standard 3 is unable to do so. The standard 3 interception window is therefore extremely narrow even if it exists.

Criterion 6 can carry out terminal interception of incoming weapons, but its flight speed is slow and its shooting height is limited. Its role in anti-ASBM defense is roughly equivalent to RAM in anti-aircraft missile operations, with an interception window of at most 10 Seconds, and “Moscow is behind.” Between the standard 3 (theoretical) long-range interception and the standard 6’s last battle, there is a huge lack of defense, and the superb gliders can go unimpeded. In contrast, the air defense system of the aircraft carrier formation includes carrier-based fighters for outer interception and RAM & Phalanx at the end of the gate, as well as standard 6 long-range ship-to-air missiles, standard 2 medium-range air defense missiles, and ESSM medium and short-range missiles. The three lines of defense of air defense missiles are deep enough to provide a window of engagement from hundreds of seconds (when fighting supersonic weapons) to thousands of seconds (when intercepting subsonic weapons). So if the mold fleet can intercept DF-21D & DF-26, of course it can. The question is, if one salvo hits out 18 ASBMs and is intercepted/baited by 50%, and the remaining 9 can get close contact with the target, did the mold interception operation succeed or fail?

The second question: Did only ASBM exploit the loopholes in the Imperial Navy’s air and space defense system?

zhiwo

By zhiwo

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helpmekim
9 months ago

Capable but unable to completely intercept it is like the US NMD defense system can block intercontinental ballistic missiles, but how many interceptor bombs are deployed and how many nuclear warheads can it block? And nuclear bombs are similar to ASBMs. As long as a few missed, it can be caused. Major damage and in order to ensure the hit rate, it usually requires two to one. Therefore, the number of shield ships equipped with standard 3 and the number of standard 3 purchases can be found. In addition, it is like not F35 that has to produce more than 3,000 in total. These more than 3,000 F35s are all owned by the U.S. Empire, not to mention the more than 1,000 U.S. Empire’s future or the existing three to four hundred F35s deployed to the Asia-Pacific region-the same is true for shield ships with mid-stage interception capabilities.

heloword
9 months ago

The “air defense” capability of an aircraft carrier is useless-note that air defense and missile defense are two different concepts. Air defense refers to combating aircraft and cruise missiles in the atmosphere. In this way, the entire fleet of fighters and various anti-aircraft missile carriers of different levels can participate in operations in different positions—not only destroyers, but future US frigates. FFGX currently seems to have regional air defense capabilities and can also participate in air defense operations. On the other hand, if the attacker wants to organize aviation anti-ship operations, the difficulty is also very high-you not only need a large enough fleet, but also a strong organization and scheduling ability, so that some fighters will first engage with the carrier-based aircraft to open the attack. Passage, allowing some auxiliary aircraft to perform reconnaissance and positioning tasks (the positioning must be maintained throughout the attack) and enough fighters and attack aircraft to launch missiles. The entire process must be tightly integrated, and a slight error will cause the attack to fail.

helpyme
9 months ago

The anti-missile law is completely different. First of all, fighters and frigates can only watch when ballistic missiles fly outside the atmosphere, so only destroyer cruisers with standard-3 can participate in the operation-and then the difficulty of intercepting ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere has other answers. Science is popular, so I won’t talk about it here. And the most important point is that the difficulty of organizing an anti-ship attack based on ASBM is extremely low. Basically, all units of our rocket force have the capability of brigade-level salvos. A salvo of 18-36 missiles is a basic operation. So if the interception success rate of a missile is set to 0.75 (this is already a very, very optimistic estimate), how is the probability of a complete interception successful? I shouldn’t need to say this. In addition, the launch preparation time of the missile is much shorter than that of the aviation anti-ship force, and the time from the discovery of the target to the landing of the missile is no more than 30 minutes (this is a conservative estimate assuming that it will take 10 minutes to launch after the target is discovered) In this way, the pressure of reconnaissance is also greatly reduced. In actual combat, our army can use the satellite system to conduct a general survey, and then launch a high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft for detailed investigation (again, this thing cannot be intercepted by the aircraft carrier formation). You can start playing directly.

sina156
9 months ago

This is still assuming the situation of only one attack. In actual combat, the replacement of solid missiles can take up to half an hour, and the United States does not have any means to launch a rocket force in our interior within half an hour (now no need to preset a position. , Just find a flat and open place to launch) means of rapid strike. In fact, to further say that the United States does not have any non-nuclear means to cause meaningful strikes on our inland my country-because all the United States can do now is the aviation anti-ship operations mentioned above (this should be replaced by aviation strike operations). Whether it is Tomahawk missiles or F-35, in order to conduct a large-scale strike, you must first gather superior forces and launch an air campaign to seize air supremacy (in my country’s airspace)—and before that, the United States’ main naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific The command and logistics system will be paralyzed by the rocket army, and then completely wiped out by the air force of our army. The only thing the U.S. military can count on is the B-21. However, unless the B-21 is capable of supersonic crossing, it is of little significance (it is safe only if it starts from the United States. Guam will also be hit during the war, and the strategic bombers simply cannot evacuation)

yahoo898
9 months ago

In the later stages of World War II, battleships were often equipped with densely packed anti-aircraft guns. Although these anti-aircraft guns could shoot down enemy fighters, they still could not stop the era of carrier replacement of battleships. The reason is that the aircraft carrier’s strike range is at the 200 km level, while the battleship has a deterrent effect only within 30 km. After all, the battleship could only passively defend and could not hit the aircraft carrier, so it was eliminated. Back to this question, the strike range of modern carrier-based aircraft is generally within 1000 nautical miles. However, the strike range of both DF-21D and DF-26 exceeds 1000 nautical miles, which exceeds the strike range of carrier-based aircraft. The carrier battle group is only capable of intercepting with a certain probability, but not capable of counterattack. At this time, it is not meaningful to discuss whether it can intercept.

leexin
9 months ago

In the later stages of World War II, battleships were often equipped with densely packed anti-aircraft guns. Although these anti-aircraft guns could shoot down enemy fighters, they still could not stop the era of carrier replacement of battleships. The reason is that the aircraft carrier’s strike range is at the 200 km level, while the battleship has a deterrent effect only within 30 km. After all, the battleship could only passively defend and could not hit the aircraft carrier, so it was eliminated. Back to this question, the strike range of modern carrier-based aircraft is generally within 1000 nautical miles. However, the strike range of both DF-21D and DF-26 exceeds 1000 nautical miles, which exceeds the strike range of carrier-based aircraft. The carrier battle group is only capable of intercepting with a certain probability, but not capable of counterattack. At this time, it is not meaningful to discuss whether it can intercept.

greatword
9 months ago

When technology is not a problem and money is not a problem, then the problem is only strategic will. Whether there is a strategic will that is not afraid to make things big becomes the key to the game. Let’s assume that during the 16-year South China Sea conflict, China and the United States really started their hands. At this time, whoever the balance of the war is leaning against, only depends on whether the high-level rabbits have concentrated all their attack methods to destroy the opponent’s strategic will to leave the fleet. I believe there are, but I didn’t fight. In order to calm down the situation, I can persuade them, but I must be reckless. Washington will be surprised to see this kind of “freak and mad” style of play, I can’t say, but I will definitely not venture into the coverage of the Rockets again. The biting temper of rabbits is not new. Not only is it not new, it is still a routine operation.

loveyou
9 months ago

Although today’s war technology has improved, the strategic thinking on the South China Sea battlefield is the same as on the Korean battlefield back then-once the fighters are available, they will concentrate their superior forces to fight the annihilation war. At that time, which US fleet was in the South China Sea, and which designation was gone. So back to the subject of the subject, as long as the tactical preparations and strategic will for super-saturation attacks are made under the guidance of Mao’s military ideology, not to be quiet, not afraid of making things happen, and facing the statistical rather than rhetorical meaning. Thousands of arrows were fired to intercept a hammer.

strongman
9 months ago

Whether it can be blocked is a matter of time, and the interception rate is a matter of time. The current interception rate of ballistic missiles cannot be too high. More importantly, the aircraft carrier is here to beat people, not to fight back. The threat of ballistic missiles to the aircraft carrier objectively deprives the aircraft carrier of the freedom of navigation. Due to the need to face the threat of ballistic missiles, it must maintain a distance from the opponent’s launch unit. This fact has caused the unrealization of the aircraft carrier’s land attack. This actually violates the principle of operational use of aircraft carriers: offense is the only value of aircraft carriers.

stockin
9 months ago

Let’s leave aside the political factors and wait for a brief calculation of the economic account: The cost of Standard 3, I found on the domestic website an average of $12.6 million per round, which is the purchase price of the US Navy in 2017; on the wiki, it is a single round. / A single set of 9 million to 25 million US dollars. What about Dongfeng? DF-21D, a 2014 article in Time magazine considered it to be worth 25 million U.S. dollars; DF-26, no cost estimate data could be found, some people guessed it was 180 million to 250 million yuan in 2017, based on the 2017 average exchange rate 6.7518 calculation, equivalent to 26.66 million to 37.03 million US dollars. Assuming that the east wind is intercepted by the United States with standard 3, the ratio of the number of east wind to standard 3 is unknown, but it should be at least one to one. (In 2016, a Tieba Great God estimated that it was 1:3. I agree with his point. Therefore, the original answer was three standard 3s to intercept one east wind; but now the source cannot be found, so the ratio is now removed) (70th anniversary The military parade showed that the hypersonic glide warhead may be equipped on DF-21D and DF26, so it is true, it should require more standards 3 to be able to intercept, or even unable to intercept)

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