Poland’s congenital deficiencies + the Soviet Union stabbed in the back, this is actually a crime of non-war (of course, we will not talk about the previous Soviet Union’s attempt to help Czechoslovakia through Daulan, but was rejected by Dabobo). Let’s look specifically at the situation in France and the Soviet Union. [French Campaign] France: 1. Appeasement is the consensus of French public opinion. The shadow of World War I caused the people themselves to be unwilling to fight. The French surrender is the right answer for the people. After all, from a racial perspective, Hitler would not attack the French. Extinction: That’s why there is a joke: “No matter what shortcomings the Petain government has, it can do things related to surrender, and it can do it vigorously.” 2. The military’s tactical thinking stayed during the First World War, and basically hoped after the declaration of war on Germany. Relying on the Maginot line of defense once and for all, there was no effective war mobilization at all, and the management of armaments resources was also messed up (for example, after the surrender, there were more fighter aircraft reserves than war). That’s why there is a well-known “false war”; 3. Lack of strategic depth, the German army If conditions permit the rapid occupation of important cities such as Paris through a blitzkrieg, France can only surrender; 4. Britain and France themselves have not reached an absolute tacit agreement. The biggest casualties of the French Navy in World War II was the British attack on the French military port. The German side: 1. Boldly chose the Ardennes Forest as a breakthrough point, bypassing the French heavy fortress in one fell swoop, and caught France by surprise; 2. Hitler had previously annexed Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia, and blitzed Poland to accumulate high popularity, allowing him to rank high. The people’s decisive decision to go to war (and the failure of his assassination), the mobilization effect of the whole army was stronger than that of France; 3. The Versailles Treaty caused many years of humiliation to Germany, and the people did not have too strong anti-war sentiment (after France surrendered, even Germany) Some people who opposed Hitler were so excited that they burst into tears and chanted long live). [Soviet Campaign] The Soviet Union: 1. Unexpected depth of the country + unlimited population + sparse infrastructure (causing the German army to advance quickly) + winter nuclear weapons; 2. Hitler’s ideological hostility to the Soviet Union and the Slavic peoples, such as massacres , Shooting all Soviet political commissars, etc., resulting in only truthful propaganda, enough to give the Soviet army and civilians more reason to resist to the end, lack of room for compromise; 3. The Soviet Union decisively transferred arms manufacturing plants, and quickly restored production capacity, while gaining Material support from the United Kingdom and the United States; 4. Stalin quickly cheered up after the initial strike, and equipped the Red Army with commanders such as Zhukov and God of War, and the Red Army formed a cohesive force. On the German side: 1. Encountered with the interference of the Soviet-Finnish war, insufficient judgment on the combat effectiveness of the Soviet army, unable to achieve the strategic goals as planned; 2. Failure to force the British to surrender before launching Barbarossa, and was in a two-sided combat situation for a long time; 3. Small country resources The population has an upper limit, the front line is stretched + the battle situation is stalemate, it is easy to care about one and the other, one step is wrong; 4. Also because of the shortage of labor, a large number of foreign labor and prisoners of war can only be used, and the production efficiency is not guaranteed. 5. Italian pig teammates rashly invaded Greece, affecting Germany’s original plan.


By zhiwo

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6 months ago

The performance of the Soviet Army in the early stage of the Soviet-German War was not much different from that of France and Poland. By the end of 41, the German army occupied about one million square kilometers of the Soviet Union’s land area, and the Soviet army lost 4.5 million people. Except for not surrendering, the military performance was no better than that of France and Poland. The difference is that the Soviet Union has a huge land area as a depth, and the German supply line is difficult to maintain the offensive. At the same time, to quote Grants, the last is the Soviet mobilization system, the Red Army’s self-education ability in the war, the Soviet military and the country seem to be in the face of suffering. Infinite endurance saved the Soviet state and brought her ultimate victory.

6 months ago

The Frenchman’s problem is that his cuisine is just right: if the French army is stronger, it is likely to piece together a reserve team to block the gap, instead of being copied by a small number of German armored units from the entire first army group-after all The troops on the western front are too dense. There are more than six million troops piled up on the 1,000-kilometer front, and there are not so many flaws for them to drill. If the French army is more prepared, then they are likely to abandon the d plan of advancing to central Belgium to build the line of defense, and implement the e plan with a more rear defense position. In this way, the German armored forces will head into the French 9th Army and reserve. The team’s arms instead of rushing to the beach without hindrance. Can you stop it? At least the strategic posture of the entire First Army Group will be much better than the situation on the plane.

6 months ago

If the analysis is simply too much, for example, the Nazi reactionary system has very poor mobilization ability, Hitler reversing after taking office seriously undermined German industrial production, the corruption of the Nazi government led to human and resources not being sent to the front line, and so on. The most direct reason is that the German intelligence service has seriously misjudged the strength of the Soviet Union many times in a row. Put aside how much damage the Great Purge has caused to the Red Army (in fact, many modern studies in Russia believe that the Red Army that has not undergone the Great Purge will collapse quickly. Tukhachevsky’s ability and position are very serious. The whole The loyalty and organization of the Red Army are also questionable.) There is no doubt that the Great Purge turned the Soviet Union into an intelligence black hole. In the summer of 1941, before Barbarossa, the Germans believed that the Soviet Union had only 1.5 million troops on the Western Front. In fact, this 1.5 million is the Soviet Union’s first cluster, and there are 800 to 1 million reserves and more than 15 million mobilizable troops behind. Germany knows nothing about this. They don’t think the Soviet Union is capable of mobilizing new troops. This misjudgment made the Germans insufficiently prepared, which directly led to the long-term failure of Leningrad and the defeat of the Moscow campaign. In the summer of 1942, the Germans believed that the Soviet Union had 6000 aircraft, 6000 tanks and 8000 artillery on the western front at this time. But in fact the Soviet army has 22,000 aircraft, 24,000 tanks and 33,000 artillery. This misjudgment led the Germans to boldly use a blue scheme with a gradual reduction in complexity comparable to the nine dans when attacking the Caucasus. In the end, the southern offensive stopped at Stalingrad and failed to complete the campaign goal. In the summer of 1943, the Germans believed that they were facing the same Soviet army as before, but in fact the Soviet army had already rebuilt the combined armies of various arms and the tank army at this time. The breakthrough and offensive capabilities were not only far better than the previous self and even surpassed the previous year. The German army and the powerful logistics dispatching ability (thanks to the trucks sent by the American old iron) have crushed the sacred mule and horse empire of Fira. This misjudgment led the Germans to ruin their last strategic initiative in Kursk and turn to a full passive defense. It can be seen that in fact, the German army has prepared troops that far exceed the Soviet army in quantity and quality every time according to the intelligence. The result is that they are different from the previous ones. You can say that the German generals and marshals should know how to expect the enemy to be lenient, but the actual situation is that the intelligence said that there is a creek in front of them, and the Germans feel that they must at least prepare according to the Rhine. In fact, the Soviets are the Bering Strait. The intelligence department’s pot can’t escape anyway

6 months ago

The evidence is so clear that the invader was destroyed by his own exertions. “The evidence is so clear that the invader was destroyed by his own exertions.” Clausewitz On War 385 above is Clausewitz On War. The explanation of Napoleon’s fiasco under Moscow. I think this is completely correct to explain the German army in World War II. Therefore, from the perspective of Clausewitz’s strategic theory, a few humors. The German army itself has a selective inheritance of Clausewitz’s war theory. Think of offense as a positive behavior. Annihilate the main force of the enemy in a decisive battle and force the enemy to accept your own political will. Of course, Kraussawitz’s “On War” is a posthumous work that has not been completely revised, providing infinite possibilities for different interpretations in later generations. One of them is the tension between war as an existential construction (life and death) and war as a policy tool. Clausewitz himself links these two points to an important argument that is the use of unrestrained violence in decisive battles to achieve political claims. Clausewitz’s “On War” itself contains reflections on Napoleon’s tragic defeat in Russia: Napoleon’s pursuit of offensive and decisive battles itself caused the destruction of the French army itself: the scorched earth policy of the Russian army, avoiding war and retreating, As well as the vastness of Russia, the offensive itself became the seed of the French army’s own destruction. The energy of the French army was exhausted by Napoleon’s pursuit of offensive and decisive battles. The German generals themselves were figuring out whether the war was a tool for them to determine the existence of the “imperial state” or a political extension/policy (politik in German is very subtle, it can be both policy and politics). The above is a mess in itself. Every war after the Napoleonic Wars is a battle of life and death in the eyes of the Prussian General Staff. The pursuit of unrestricted submarine warfare in the First World War, the speculation of the purpose of the war itself, “the next battle is the decisive battle of strategic victory” and every military plan since the Franco-Prussian War are all unclear on the political purpose of the war. It is evidence that the German generals are constantly sleepwalking in strategic thinking. Although the German army has always been an unparalleled European army in operational command, it has always been a paradox in strategy. After the First World War, a vote of German generals represented by Ludendorff once again wiped out the disastrous strategic failure of the German army by advocating the “bayonet betrayal” conspiracy theory (Jewish profiteers and Social Democrats betrayed the army and the emperor led to Germany’s defeat). During the war, the German military’s military innovations were completely inherited, and the idea of ​​developing military offensive-annihilation wars was ubiquitous. So the irony of history is that this military strategy sowed the seeds of destruction for the Germans themselves. The mechanization of ground forces, the centralized use of armored forces, the development of tactical air forces, and the innovation of command and control technology enabled the German forces in the early days of World War II to continuously surround and divide the enemy’s main force with annihilating battles, so that the enemy can react before it can react. He was defeated in the battle. (But this military thought itself is the inheritance and development of the German military doctrine behind Clausewitz, and has nothing to do with the Aryan superhuman logic of the German III.) The defensive strategy and army establishment of Poland and France determine the decisive battle After being surrounded and cut off by the German army by surprise, its armed forces lost the ability to resist. Almost all politicians, commanders, and staff of the Allied Powers in 1940-42 were scratching their heads and thinking about how to counter this idea. The experience of the Soviet army itself being completely annihilated in many battles during 41-42 years itself is the epitome of the powerlessness of various countries against the German army in this revolutionary war mode during this period. The poor performance of the German army in the Soviet Union also ironically demonstrated the self-destructive nature of the Third Reich. It was Hitler’s brutal and inhuman genocide in Eastern Europe that caused a large number of people who were dissatisfied with the Soviet Union to finally fall into the Red Army. The German army’s large amounts of human resources and weapons and ammunition in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus invested in the extinction activities of the beasts that did not help its military occupation itself is the best proof of this ideological determinism. The magic weapon used by the Red Army to defeat Hitler was very similar to the magic weapon used by the Russian Army to defeat Napoleon in the early days: the scorched earth policy, strategic retreat, and a clearer understanding that this war will be a war of extermination. The reason that drove the German army to launch the Barbarossa project was the ideological hatred of the “Jewish Bolsheviks” and the ideological fantasy of establishing a living space; and the strategic assumption for the success of the plan was that the Soviet Union could be destroyed by annihilating the main force of the Soviet army in a decisive battle. Surrender. The German army succeeded in the campaign action starting from reaching the strategic hypothesis. By the time the German soldiers approached Moscow, the “Aryan Superman” had occupied three times the land of France and the Soviet army equivalent to the size of the entire Soviet army before the war. But so far, the Germans have won every battle and lost the entire war. The Soviet Union’s more successful integration of the entire national economic system into the military track and the ability of the Red Army generals to continuously learn how to control the “German-style war” during the war has completely bankrupted the German strategic assumptions. If it is said that from the Battle of Moscow, the German “Campaign Almighty Theory” began to go bankrupt in this battle of life and death, then the result of the Battle of Kursk marked the beginning of the Soviet army’s strategic ability and industrial potential to control the “German-style” offensive campaign. Overtake the Germans in an all-round way. In this sense, the German generals’ fascination with the memoirs of the French army and the success of the Soviet army attributable to the endless “human tactics” and “material advantages” of the other side are both intentional or undoubted ignorance and concealment of their own strategic failures. . After all, Clausewitz himself proposed the formula of war: primitive violence, enmity and hatred (violence, enmity and hatred) are tensions that oppose each other at the individual, military and national levels. The German III’s answer in Clausewitz-style strategic thinking was obviously a failure: the ideological hatred of Nazism swallowed the understanding of the basic understanding that war is a policy tool; German military thinking rejected the defeat in World War I Acknowledgment hinders its reflection on the use of violence and its strategy; and the hostility of the entire German Third Reich to the entire world has turned the two incompatible worlds of the capitalist world and socialist countries into wartime allies . This bloodthirsty, clumsy, and reckless fascist strategy is prevented by the blood, labor and calm fighting of the anti-fascist coalition people, which is a great blessing in human history.

6 months ago

Poland is an agricultural country. Germany has upgraded to the advanced stage of full armor, and the degree of air and land coordinated combat. At that time, Poland could only use cavalry against German armor, and the outcome was ironclad. France put all the bets on the Maginot line, and still clings to the mindset of World War I, believing that trench warfare will kill Germany. But Germany has evolved a long time ago. It used speed and breakthrough methods to abandon the First World War mentality, and used Manstein’s method to directly and boldly bypass the Maginot Line. As for the Soviet Union, it is really another matter. Germany’s prior investigations into the Soviet Union’s military and industrial capabilities were too rash, and did not expect the Soviet Union to have such a great war potential. The estimate for the Soviet Union is at the end of six weeks, which shows how contemptuous the Soviet Union is. Germany, seeing the Soviet Union’s tragic victory in Finland and the great internal purges of the Soviet army, thought that the Soviet army would be defeated at a single blow, and its military strength and industrial capabilities were also limited. But in fact, the Soviet Union has a large strategic space on the one hand, and rich human resources on the other, so that Harder, the German general staff, said in his diary that he thought that the Soviet army would be over if he had captured millions of people, but he actually finished one fight. Several more divisions appeared. It can only be said that Germany made a big mistake in investigating the overall national strength of the Soviet Union. As a result, Germany’s plan at the time was to seize Soviet oil fields and grain after six weeks of victory over the Soviet Union, and then the German industry would switch to production, focusing on the air force and navy in preparation for the subsequent confrontation with the United States. In fact, this is also the case. The logistics cannot keep up. From tank lubricants, spare parts, fuel oil used in winter to soldiers’ razors to winter military coats, logistics are not prepared, and I have never thought about it. For the winter in the Soviet Union, I will stop cooking now—–

6 months ago

The blitz in Germany was epoch-making at the time. Those European officers who were still in the mindset of World War I were beaten to the ground without reacting, such as the Czech Republic and Poland. Their command thoughts had not kept up with the military technology of the time, and they had the brains of World War I and the weapons of World War II. There are two reasons for the rapid destruction of France: First, the leadership is low in military literacy. De Gaulle did not include de Gaulle. His pre-war thinking height was sufficient. He discovered the role of mobile warfare in the Polish-Soviet War very early. In 1921, he said that tanks should be used in groups instead of scattered. Wrote two books specially. Guderian called the expert, but Petain didn’t listen to him. So who listened? German. Hitler even asked people to read de Gaulle’s books to him. In turn, Petain believes in trenches and does not believe that aircraft and tanks have changed the logic of war. The old man represented by him still firmly believes in long live the digging hole, believes that the construction of the defense line is the first in the world, and the thinking is extremely backward. Of course, it may be that France is indeed short of money, and it is difficult to get it even if you want. When Germany attacked France, the troops led by de Gaulle were one of the few that could stop Germany. Unfortunately, his position at the time was too low to control the overall situation. Second, low military literacy is only one of the reasons, and perhaps the more important reason is: the French are weak in fighting will. Otherwise it is impossible to pull it like this, if you ask the French at the time: why don’t you tata should (fight)? They will say: Fighting, the battle of my generation was over as early as World War I. I’m tired now, don’t want to fight, destroy it, hurry up. Although the French were a victor in World War I, they won very, very miserably. A large number of young people died, which can be said to have lost a generation. However, after the war, his request was severely rejected by the Angs, leading to a generation of sacrifices almost in vain. After the war, France didn’t get their corresponding “remuneration” at all. What Britain wanted was the balance of power on the mainland, not leaving France at all. Just like a licking dog who has given sincerely but has been abandoned, how dare he give sincerely. If the French really worked hard, would the British and Americans remember the French’s credit afterwards? If they would, they would not be Ansa. Besides, the “conditions of surrender” that Moustache gave France is very generous, at least the interests of the ruling class are preserved. As for the feelings of the lower class, do they care?

6 months ago

Military is always the continuation of politics. 1. Poland was abandoned by Britain and France because Britain and France wanted Germany to attack the Soviet Union. 2. There are many reasons for France’s failure. The most important points are as follows: 2.1 The main battlefield on the Western Front of World War I is in France, and France has been beaten up and down. 2.2 The economic crisis caused the French Communist Party to become the largest opposition party. As far as the French ruling class is concerned, continuing the fight will inevitably bring the French Communist Party to power. The best result of the French Communist Party coming to power is to reproduce Madrid, that is, the civil war between Nazism and Communism. The intermediate result was the Paris Commune, that is, the Nazis were led by the bourgeois army. The worst result was the French Revolution. That is, the red wave swept across France. France, the Soviet Union, one east and one west, Communism shines in Europe. These are not acceptable. 3. In the Soviet Union, Germany did not make good use of national contradictions, “class” contradictions, and urban-rural contradictions. In conclusion, the military must serve politics. And talking about military affairs without talking about politics is water without roots

6 months ago

The depth of Poland and France is too small, and the suddenness of the blitz is enough to allow the Germans to completely penetrate the opponent before the opponent reacts, occupy the important area and make the opponent lose resistance. But the depth of the Soviet Union is really too large (especially the east-west direction, this is a Trumpet-shaped, bigger as you go in), your Germans tore my line of defense? I just put another one at the back; the Germans defeated the Red Army? Just retreat for a while and reorganize; the sudden attack by the German army did cause a huge blow to the Soviet Union, but the vast depth of the Soviet Union gradually diluted the German army, and the subsequent German attack was no longer sudden.

6 months ago

1. The Battle of Poland was basically a purely national crush. Although Poland was considered a second-rate military power before the war, Germany reorganized its combat readiness 33 years later, as well as a series of operations to swallow Otun Sudede. It is already slightly stronger than France in terms of national power. At the same level as the British and Soviet Unions, Poland’s blitzkrieg against the Germans was basically without a fight. The coordinated battles and air-ground coordination were completely new tactics at the time. It was basically no surprise that it was defeated in a month of dual crushing of thought and national power. . 2. As for France, the situation is quite special. France is extremely war-weary from the high-level to the civilians. The Frenchman who entered the Rhineland region by San Dezi didn’t just let it go. He has already spied the end of the future. Before the war, the British and French coalition forces were slightly stronger on paper than the German forces, but the French army was directly divided into two at the beginning of the war. If France leaves more than one reserve team to block the gap in time, if France is in the south of the central and stubborn resistance, it will be difficult to fight. It is not as popular as it is today (of course, there is a high probability of losing the war within half a year, and the ending is also likely to support the puppets in the south) 3. The Soviet Union, the great defeat at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was completely debuffed by the purge of the benevolent father, and the number of troops was not There is little but nothing. The command system has not been completely rebuilt. All kinds of mediocrities flood the army. Pavlov’s pig operations have caused hundreds of thousands of the main force of the Western Front to be surrounded and annihilated. I feel no better than France. Moreover, before the war, Germany was against the Soviet Union. The strength is overestimated, and I want to push it to Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan within a few months, even if I play steel ambitions, it is not that simple. Starting in the winter of 1941, the Barbarossa project had actually failed. NAZI’s weird regime and ideology simply cannot carry out a national mobilization. As long as the Soviet Union survives the initial defeat and rebuilds its command system and expands its army in time, it is only a matter of time before the Soviet Union wins.

6 months ago

In Poland, the Germans have an advantage in their equipment. How can they be played? It can’t be said that it is bad, at least it is not the only performance. In France, it should be said that they played particularly well. The equipment advantage is in France, and the degree to which they can still play is mainly a manifestation of the advantage of tactical concepts. But it turned out that a big reason was that the blood was drained by France during World War I. As a result, the United States and Britain sold France, which led to serious war-weariness in France during World War II. In fact, although the start suffered a big loss at the time, it was still possible to fight. In the Soviet Union, the advantage of tactics and concepts has been studied to a certain degree. The advantage of equipment is a little bit small, but the advantage of war preparation is great, so the early stage of the fight is particularly good. But then it didn’t work anymore. First, the furry plate was too big and it was alive and well. The second is that Mustache’s entire political system is actually very corrupt, and the advantages of the industrial level are not reflected at all. After occupying France, it is obvious that the industrial area is occupied, but the main contribution is actually reflected in the support of food, indicating that the management of the German occupation area is completely Stay on the plunder of natural resources and existing resources. Therefore, after the Soviet Union was fully activated, the number of products showed an overwhelming advantage when the number of machine tools and the industrial population and resources were completely inferior. The third is system advantages, ideological advantages, ideological advantages, and national advantages. In general, Mao’s mobilization degree is not to mention corrupt Nazis. It is also a unique existence in human history. What is the concept of 15% of national deaths? We are still insisting after 200 million people have been killed. We still insist on fighting frontally, and we can keep on attacking, and we can push back to the enemy’s capital. If you add in the statistics of military injuries and illnesses, a quarter of the people in the country are injured or killed. It is not counted that the people who have not died are not counted, and they can still be beaten. It is not a problem of a generation.

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